In this article, we apply theory and research on self-focused attention and self-regulatory processes to the problem of depression and use this framework to integrate the roles played by a variety of psychological processes emphasized by other theories of the development and maintenance of depression. We propose that depression occurs after the loss of an important source of self-worth when an individual becomes stuck in a self-regulatory cycle in which no responses to reduce the discrepancy between actual and desired states are available. Consequently, the individual falls into a pattern of virtually constant self-focus, resulting in intensified negative affect, self-derogation, further negative outcomes, and a depressive self-focusing style in which he or she self-focuses a great deal after negative outcomes but very little after positive outcomes. Eventually, these factors lead to a negative self-image, which may take on value by providing an explanation for the individual's plight and by helping the individual avoid further disappointments. The depressive self-focusing style then maintains and exacerbates the depressive disorder. We review findings from laboratory studies of mild to moderately depressed people, correlational studies of more severely depressed people, and clinical observations with respect to consistency with the theory.
cognitive, and (d) behavioral. Of course, some theories embody features of more than one of these categories; nonetheless, we believe that this taxonomy is a useful way of organizing contemporary thinking about the role of psychological processes in depression. In the following sections, we offer a brief overview of each of these perspectives. Of course, it would be impossible to do justice to any of these perspectives in the limited Slmce available; therefore, we refer the interested reader to appropriate sources for more complete reviews of each perslx~dve.
The Psychoanalytic Perspective
Since the initial seminal work of Sigmund Freud (1917 Freud ( / 1986 , psychoanalytic theories of depression have emphasized the importance of losses of central sources of love and emotional security in the onset of depression. Such losses are then posited to produce a variety ofintrapsychic consequences, ultimately culminating in the state of depression. As psychoanalytic theories of depression have evolved, the emphasis has shifted from the loss of external narcissistic gratification from others to the loss of such internal sources of security as selfesteem. (For a thorough review of psychoanalytic theories of depression, see Mendelson, 1982 , or Arieti & Bemporad, 1978 In Freud's ( 1917 Freud's ( /1986 ) classic work on depression, "Mourning and Meloancholia," he observed that such losses often produce severe and seemingly irrational self-criticism and castigation. In his own words, "One part of the ego sets itself against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object" (p. 52). To explain this extreme self-criticism, Freud hypothesized that the reproach of self is really not directed toward the self at all, but rather, is directed toward the lost object that has been introjected into the person's own ego. Because open hostility toward the object would produce guilt, the individual directs his or her anger inward onto the self. Thus, from Freud's perspective, depression is the result of the directing of the hostile side of ambivalent feelings toward a lost object inward toward the self.
Somewhat later, Rado (1928) presented a variation on Freud's (1917 Freud's ( /1986 theory that gave increased emphasis to the need for self-esteem. He likened the depression-prone individual to a child whose sense of self-worth is overly dependent on his or her parents' approval. For Rado, the depression-prone individual is overly dependent on others for approval. After the loss of a central object, such people react with anger and bitterhess, but, because such tactics are unlikely to be effective in restoring the object, they soon adopt the strategy of self-punishment, repentance, and guilt in an attempt to gain the object's sympathy and love and, ultimately, restore their sense of selfworth. From this perspective, then, depression is essentially selfpunishment in an attempt to regain self-esteem after a significant loss. Bibring (1953) made a more extreme departure from Freud's (1917 Freud's ( /1986 ) formulation when he broadened the basis for depression-producing loss to events other than the loss of love from central others. For Bibring, depression reflects a breakdown of ego mechanisms that control self-esteem; such breakdowns occur when a person is unable to meet his or her strong ego-relevant aspirations. Thus, he argued, depression results from a helpless ego rather than a critical superego's turning against the ego.
The Control Perspective
Like the psychoanalytic perspective, the control perspective on depression emphasizes impactful losses as a primary factor in the onset of depression. From the control perspective, however, loss can lead to depression because it can lead the individual to perceive an absence of contingency between behavior and outcomes. Since the publication of Seligman's (1975) influential arguments on the relation between learned helplessness and depression, this perspective has had a great impact on theorizing about depression. Although there have been many variations (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Klinger, 1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975) , the general notion is that after experience with uncontrollable outcomes, the individual develops low expectancies for exerting control over later outcomes that could, in fact, be controlled. These low expectancies, in turn, produce a wide range of motivational, cognitive, and affective deficits that constitute the state of depression.
Seligman and colleagues' early research with infrahuman subjects demonstrated that experience with uncontrollable outcomes does indeed produce deficits in subsequent performance. (For a review of this literature, see Maier & Seligman, 1976) . More recently, researchers have turned their attention to the effects of uncontrollable outcomes on humans. (For a review, see Costello, 1978 .) These studies revealed a variety of complexities and problems with the original helplessness formulation. Consequently, several revisions of the helplessness model have been proposed.
After noting similarities and inconsistencies between the learned helplessness model and Brehm's (1966) reactance theory and reviewing several studies showing that uncontrollable outcomes sometimes facilitate performance on later tasks, Wortman and Brehm (1975) proposed an integration of the two theories. They argued that the initial response to uncontrollable outcomes is an increase in motivation, effort, and performance; however, as experience with uneontrollability increases, motivation decreases and helplessness effects emerge. They further posited that the more important the outcome, the more exposure to uncontrollability that is required before the individual lapses into helplessness.
Several years later, Abramson et al. (1978) proposed a revised learned helplessness model that incorporated the person's attributions for his or her loss of control as a mediator between the absence of control and the emergence of helplessness-related deficits and depression. Specifically, Abramson et al. proposed that helplessness and depression are likely to occur after an inability to produce a highly desired outcome or prevent a highly aversive outcome. The specific form these deficits take depends on the attribution a person makes for his or her inability to control the outcome. Abramson et al. proposed a three-dimensional taxonomy of attributions, with each dimension determining a specific aspect of the learned helplessness effect. According to this revised model, (a) the greater the internality of the attribution, the greater the loss of self-esteem; (!o) the greater the stability of the attribution, the greater the chronicity of the helplessness deficits; and (c) the greater the globality of the attribuation, the wider the range of behavioral domains to which the helplessness effects generalize. Thus, from the revised learned helplessness perspective, the inability to produce a highly desired outcome or avoid a highly aversive outcome instigates inferential processes aimed at generating an attribution for one's loss of control; the attribution that one derives affects one's expectancies for control over future outcomes; these expectancies, in turn, affect one's serf-esteem, motivation, affect, and performance in later situations. Abramson et al. further lx~ited that depression-prone individuals possess a unique depressive attributional style, consisting of a tendency to make internal, stable, and global attributions, that predisposes them to become depressed when they experience uncontrollable outcomes.
The Cognitive Persl~ctive
The revised learned helplessness model and, inde~ most other contemporary thinking about depression has been greatly influenced by Beck's (1967 Beck's ( , 1976 cognitive theory of depression. According to Beck, depression is caused by a negative depressogenic cognitive set or schema that predisposes one to become depressed when stressful events or kmes occur. sion-prone individuals are characterized by a "depressive triad;' consisting of a negative outlook on the serf, the future, and the world. Beck argued that stressful life events or losses activate these rigid schemata, which then lead to systematic distortion of the person's thoughts and perceptions. For example, Beck argued that depressed people are especially prone to engage in arbitrary inference (drawing conclusions without sufficient supporting evidence), selective abstraction (drawing conclusions based on one of many bits of information), overgeneralization (drawing sweeping, global conclusions on the basis of single events), and magnification and minimization (exaggerating the significance of negative events and minimizing the significance of positive events).
In a related vein, Kuiper, Derry, and MacDonald (1982) proposed that a depressive self-schema exerts a negative influence on a wide range of cognitive activities, including memory, inference, and perception. They further argued that this depressive self-schema emerges gradually as the depressive episode increases in intensity. Whereas nondepressed people exhibit a generally positive self-schema, mildly depressed people's selfschemata are mixed, including both positive and negative aspects; as the depression deepens, the self-schema becomes increasingly negative. Consistent with this reasoning, Kuiper et al. (1982) demonstrated a tendency for nondepressed people to be most efficient in processing positively toned information, severely depressed people to be most efficient in processing negatively toned information, and mildly depressed people to show no differences in efficiency of processing as a function of the information's affective tone.
The Behavioral Perspective
Behavioral analyses of depression contrast sharply with other approaches. They emphasize the reduced frequency of overall activity as the primary defining characteristic of depression. For example, Lewinsohn (1975) proposed that reduction in activity level occurs when an individual experiences a low rate of response-contingent reinforcement. According to this model, when--because of personal characteristics (e.g., age, sex, and attractiveness), a lack of appropriate skills, or environmental scarcity--an individual experiences a low rate of positive reinforcement, he or she begins to emit behaviors at a lower rate. This low rate of behavior makes positive reinforcement even less likely and, consequently, instigates a vicious cycle of reduced activity and increasingly infrequent reinforcement. Eventually, this lower rate of activity may itself be reinforced, for example, when the person's friends and family members dispense sympathy, reduction in responsibilities, and increased attention to the withdrawn individual. Such reinforcement for withdrawal and inactivity increases the frequency of these behaviors.
In a related vein, Coyne (1976) argued that depressed behavior is maintained by a low rate of positive social reinforcement. From this perspective, stressful life experiences make people especially prone to seek support and reassurance from others. However, because the depressed person is so needy of this type of support, he or she often doubts its sincerity when it is received; consequently, the individual attempts to elicit additional reassurance. This demanding pattern of behavior is likely to be aversive to others, generating hostility, annoyance, and guilt. Although people may attempt to suppress direct expression of their annoyance, the depressed person may pick up subtle cues and, thus, become even more needy of reassurance and more prone to engage in the behaviors that others find aversive.
Toward an Integration
Clearly, these theories reflect a great deal of divergence in thinking about the psychological processes involved in the development and maintenance of depression. In our opinion, each perspective provides important insights into certain aspects of depression; each perspective also fails to adequately address features of depression outside of its range of convenience.
Recent theoretical and empirical work in social psychology has provided a variety of theoretical frameworks that might be useful in developing a comprehensive model of depression-related processes. Indeed, concepts from attribution theory and social cognition have already been profitably applied to the problem of depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Kuiper et al., 1982) . Perhaps the most general contemporary social psychological conception of behavior is Carver and Scheier's ( 1981) cybernetic model of self-awareness and self-regulatory pro-
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In the following pages, we present a self-regulatory perseveration theory of depression that builds on the cybernetic model of self-regulation to provide a framework useful for exploring the interrelations among the various processes involved in depression. In attempting to provide a complete psychological conceptualization of the development and maintenance of depression, we have combined insights from the psychoanalytic, control, cognitive, and behavioral perspectives with self-regulation theory to formulate a coherent sequential account of depression that specifies relations among (a) predisposing factors; (b) self-esteem-threatening life events, including losses, failures, and interpersonal difficulties; (c) resulting attempts to cope with the threatening life events; (d) cognitive, affective, and motivational consequences of the attempt to cope with the threatening event, producing the symptoms of depression; and (e) exacerbation of depressive symptoms.
The resulting theory shares with the psychoanalytic approaches an emphasis on the consequences of subjective loss for self-esteem, the role of excessive dependency as a predisposing factor, and the central role of self-criticism in the depressive state. It shares with the control theories consideration of how the individual attempts to cope with loss, the resultant attributions and expectancies, and their consequences for self-esteem and motivation. The theory also provides explanations for phenomena emphasized by the cognitive theories, such as the emergence and consequences of a negative self-schema and the tendency to magnify negative events and minimize positive events. Finally, the theory provides explanations for the reduced availability of positive reinforcers, the reinforcement of the depressive state, and the poor social outcomes emphasized by the behavioral theories. Acknowledging the importance of the diverse phenomena emphasized by these other theories, the self-regulatory perseveration theory integrates those phenomena into a unique explanatory framework for understanding their determinants and consequences.
The Intended Domain of the Theory Before proceeding to a detailed presentation of the theory, we would like to specify its intended domain of application. No single theory has accounted for or is likely to account for all the phenomena that have been labeled depression or for all the symptoms that have been associated with these phenomena; the present theory is certainly no exception. In Diagnostic and Sta-tistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1980 ) terms, our theory was designed to help account for the onset of major depression; it is not applicable to the onset of bipolar disorder, cyclothymic disorder, dysthymic disorder, or chronic hypomanic disorder or to affective disturbances associated with organic mental disorder or schizophrenia. The scope of the theory is also restricted to the onset of reactive depressions, those in which there seem to be precipitating stressful life events. We do believe, however, that the mechanism we propose for the maintenance of depression may also apply to other forms of depression, such as dysthymic disorder. Of course, as a psychological theory, it is most directly concerned with psychological symptoms of depression; it may be useful in accounting for somatic symptoms only to the extent that they result directly from psychological symptoms.
We do not offer the theory as a complete account of the determinants of the onset and maintenance of reactive major depression. It is likely that even this type of depression is multiply and interactively determined; the theory focuses on psychological processes in the onset and maintenance of depression, but a large body of theory and research suggests that a full account of this disorder may also require consideration of genetic and biochemical factors. (For reviews, see Paykel, 1982; Whybrow, Akiskal, & McKinney, 1984; Willner, 1985 .) Thus, even if our theory is correct, it may be that the processes we posit are particularly likely to occur in individuals with certain genetic or biochemical characteristics.
Self-Focused Attention
Before delineating our theory, it is important to briefly review the functions and consequences of self-focused attention. According to Duval and Wicklund (1972) , focusing attention on the self instigates a self-evaluative process, by which one's present standing on the self-relevant dimension that is currently most salient is compared with one's standard or aspiration for that dimension. When one exceeds the standard, self-focus produces positive affect. When one falls short of the standard, however, self-focus produces negative affect, resulting in attempts either to reduce the negative discrepancy or to escape self-focus. Duval and Wicklund's conceptualization has generated a considerable amount of research, most of which has been supportive of the theory. (For a thorough review of the self-awareness literature, see Carver & Scheier, 1981 , or Wicklund, 1975 More recently, Carver (1979) and Carver and Scheier ( 1981) have integrated self-awareness theory with a cybernetic model of self-regulation. Keeping many of the central components of Duval and Wicldund's ( 1972 ) self-awareness theory, Carver and Scheier conceptualize self-focus as part of a self-regulatory negative feedback cycle, the purpose of which is to keep the organism "on track" in its pursuit of important goals. From their perspective, self-focus is viewed as the test segment of a testoperate-test-exit sequence. When attention is focused on the self and a behavioral standard is salient, the person compares his or her current state with that standard. If the person meets or exceeds the standard, he or she exits the cycle, and self-focus is terminated; if the person falls short of the standard, however, he or she goes into the operate phase, in which behavior is engaged in to become closer to the standard. This is followed by further comparisons with the standard and either further attempts to conform to the standard (ffa negative discrepancy is still detected) or an exit from the cycle (if the discrepancy was eliminated during the operate phase). If, howeve~ the person's matching-to-standard behavior is impeded or disrupted, an assessment of the likelihood of successfully reducing the discrepancy ensues. If the subjective probability of successful discrepancy reduction is high, the person continues the matching-tostandard process until the discrepancy is eliminated. If, on the other hand, the subjective probability of successful discreggmcy reduction is low, the person withdraws from further efforts at discrepancy reduction and experiences negative affect.
The major differences between the Duval and Wicklund (1972) and Carver and Scheier (1981) perspectives center around the relation of affect to the process of discrepancy reduction. Duval and Wicklund (1972) and Wicklund (1975) argued that self-focns is aversive whenever a negative discrepancy is salient. From their perspective, it is this negative affect that motivates discrepancy-reducing behavior. Carver and Seheier; on the other hand, argue that it is only when there is a low probability of successfully reducing a negative discrepancy that selffocus is aversive and that discrepancy-reduction occurs independently of the arousal of affect. (For a detailed discussion of this and other differences between the two formulations, see Carver, 1979 , or Carver & Seheier, 1981 Although research generally supports Carver and Seheier's contention that self-focus is avoided only when there is a low probability of successfifl discrepancy reduction (e.g., Carver, Blaney, & Scheiet; Steenbarger & Aderman, 1979) , the role of negative affect in motivating discrepancy-reducing behavior is less clear.
Our own position on these issues is somewhat of a compromise between the two frameworks. Although we concur with Carver and Scheier's ( 1981) emphasis on the adaptive self-regulating function of self-focused attention, we maintain, as Dural and Wicklund ( 1972) did, that self-focus on negative discrepancies produces negative affect regardless of the probability of successfully reducing the discrepancy and that this negative affect then motivates discrepancy-reducing behavior. To the existing theoretical frameworks on self-attentional processes, we add one additional proposition that we find useful in providing an explanation for the onset of depression. To the extent that self-focus serves an adaptive, self-regulatory function, it follows that the initial response to disruptions, failures, and frustrations is an increase in one's level of self-focus. By focusing inward, the individual activates the self-regulatory cycle that facilitates his or her pursuit of important goals. 1 (We present reCarver and Scbeier (1981) did not explicitly ~ that failure encourages self-focus. They argued that when a self-aware ~ experiences failure, he or she will assess the likelihood that the salient standard can be more closely approximated in the future. Ifthis a s~m m e n t leads to a positive outcome expectancy, the individual will then attempt to determine how to alter behavior to meet the standard; f l i t leads to a negative outcome expectancy, the individual will withdraw from selfregulatory efforts regarding that particular standard. In contrast, we have proposed that any feedback concerning one's laefformance on an ego-relevant task is somewhat self-focusing but that failure feedback is search supporting this proposition later in the article.) Thus, from this perspective, disruption of ongoing behavior leads to the activation of a self-regulatory cycle, beginning with a shift in attention toward the self. This produces a comparison of current and desired states; as Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggested exceeding the standard produces positive affect and falling short of the standard produces negative affect. Whether this affect leads to behavior aimed at reducing the discrepancy or escaping the self-focused state depends on the subjective probability of successful reduction. As Carver and Scheier (1981) suggested, high probabilities lead to behavior aimed at reducing the discrepancy, but low probabilities lead to a withdrawal from such behavior and attempts to minimize self-focus.
In the following pages, we apply our theoretical conception of self-awareness and self-regulatory processes to the onset and maintenance of depression. We suggest that this framework provides a useful structure for integrating the roles played by a variety of factors emphasized by the theories already reviewed. We then review evidence from laboratory studies of mild to moderately depressed people, correlational studies of more severely depressed people, and clinical observations for consistency with the theory.
The Role o f Self-Focused Attention in the Onset and M a i n t e n a n c e o f Depression
On the basis of some intriguing parallels between the consequences of self-focus and a variety of characteristics commonly associated with depression, T. Smith and Greenberg ( 1981) hypothesized and found that private self-consciousness (the dispositional tendency to be highly self-focused) and depression were positively correlated in a college sample. This finding has subsequently been replicated with different measures of both selffocus and depression by Ingrain and Smith (1984) and T. Smith, Ingram, and Roth (1985) . In addition, Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, and Sieber (in press) found this relation among clinically depressed persons. T. Smith et al. also demonstrated that private self-consciousness is uniquely associated with depression and not with other signs of psychological disturbance (trait anxiety) and that among depressed individuals, current level of depressed mood is positively correlated with private self-consciousness. These findings clearly show that depression is associated with high levels of self-focus. The important question, though, is what the precise nature of this relation is.
The theories reviewed above generally concur that depression is often preceded by stressful life events or losses. These events typically involve losses in the personal, social, or work sphere. As noted earlier, a self-regulatory perspective suggests that such disrupting events are likely to increase one's tendency to focus particularly self-focusing because it makes a discrepancy between current and desired state salient. We agree that this leads to an assessment of whether and how the discrepancy can be reduced but also argue that this effort at self-regulation necessarily involves high self-focus. In the absence of failure feedback or other obstacles to achieving one's standards, there is no self-regulatory need for such elevation in self-focus. on oneself. Carver and Scheier's (1981) model of self-regulation provides insights into the consequences of such self-focus.
According to their model, discrepancy reduction is the preferred consequence of self-focus when a negative discrepancy exists. When the subjective probability of discrepancy reduction is very low, however, further self-focus is avoided, and behavior directed at reducing the discrepancy is terminated. Disengagement from the self-regulatory cycle is adaptive in such situations because it shields the individual from the negative affect engendered by the negative discrepancy and prevents him or her from fruitless persistence in pursuit of an unattainable goal.
In the course of life, many irreducible discrepancies are routinely encountered, and attempts to reduce them are abandoned without great difficulty, either through the pursuit of substitute goals (cf. Lewin, 1938; Wicldund & GoLlwitzer, 1982) or the derogation of the unattainable object (cf. Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, 1983 , Festinger, 1957 . These strategies make the absence of the desired object more tolerable and, thus, facilitate one's exit from the self-regulatory cycle. In some instances, however, the person may be unable or unwilling to give up the desired but unattainable goal. This may prevent disengagement from the self-regulatory cycle, thus leading to persistence in focus on the irreducible discrepancy.
Such fruitless persistence is likely to occur when what is lost or unattainable is of central importance to the person. To the extent that the object was a major source of emotional security and provided the individual with a sense of identity or selfworth (in Becker's, 1973 , terms, a transference object), withdrawal from the cycle will be retarded. Stated differently, this problem is likely when primary motivational commitments were linked to the lost object and few alternative commitments remain (Klinger, 1975) . The normal defensive manoeuvers of derogation of the lost object or substitution of an alternate source of gratification may not be easily accomplished in such situations. The object is so central that the person is unable to deny the significance of the loss and no other objects of even remotely similar value are available. The person is, thus, unable to exit the self-regulatory cycle (despite the low probability of successful discrepancy reduction) because he or she is unable to accept the absence of the object. 2 2 Many of the most common losses that precipitate depression involve events apparently beyond the individual's control, such as the death of a loved one or the loss of a job due to the economic failure of one's employer. It might appear, then, that such losses would not instigate a self-regulatory cycle. According to Carver and Scheier's (1981) model, however, significant disruptions induce a self-regulatory cycle, regardless of where the cause for the disruption lies. Indeed, self-focus on the negative discrepancy is seen as leading to an assessment of the cause of the problem, which then influences the direction that efforts at discrepancy reduction will take. According to the cybernetic model, high probabilities of successful discrepancy reduction lead to attempts at discrepancy reduction, and low probabilities of successful discrepancy reduction lead to withdrawal from the cycle, regardless of what the cause of the discrepancy is attributed to. We suggest, however, that when the goal or standard is too central or valuable to let go of, the person may persist in self-focusing, even though objectively there is no way the discrepancy can be reduced.
We propose that depression occurs to the extent that the individual who experiences such a loss fails to disengage the cycle and continues to self-focus in the absence of any way to regain what was lost. Essentially, the individual becomes stuck in a selfregulatory cycle in which successful discrepancy reduction is impossible. As an example, consider a situation in which an individual perceives a threat to a romantic relationship that has previously functioned as an important source of security, identity, and self-esteem. It should be adaptive for him or her to initiate a self-regulatory cycle in which the current and desired states are compared, so that behavior could be directed at reducing any discrepancy that may exist. However, once it has become clear that the relationship has ended and there is no chance of returning to the previous state, it becomes adaptive to give up the relationship and exit the self-regulatory cycle. Unfortunately, when important losses occur, people often have difficulty withdrawing from self-regulatory efforts to regain what was lost; thus, self-focus concerning the loss persists long after it would be adaptive to divert attention elsewhere. The same reasoning also applies to other common occurrences that precipitate depression, such as the death of a loved one or the loss of a job.
When individuals are preoccupied with the loss of a central source of self-esteem, they are necessarily highly self-focused. What is lost in such cases is not merely the object per se but, rather, the basis for self-esteem and emotional security that was provided by the object. Thus, after such a loss, the individual does not think merely about the loss but rather about the significance of the loss for the self.
The affective and cognitive consequences of such self-focus might be quite adaptive if instrumental responses capable of restoring the lost object were available because they provide impetus and direction for discrepancy-reducing behavior. When such responses are unavailable, however, self-focus instigates a spiraling process affecting the person's cognitive, emotional, and behavioral adjustment to the loss and culminating in a state of depression.
The cornerstone of theory and research on self-attentional processes is that self-focus sets off a self-evaluative process in which one's current and desired states are compared. Thus, failure to disengage the self-regulatory cycle after an irreversible loss would lead to virtually constant confrontation with the irreducible negative discrepancy. Both the Carver and Scheier (1981) and Duval and Wicklund (1972) models posit that selffocus on an irreducible negative discrepancy produces negative affect. It is this negative affect that would normally lead to avoidance of self-focus and disengagement of the self-regulatory cycle. Self-focus is also posited to enhance awareness of internal states (of. Seheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1981) . This increased awareness further increases the intensity of the negative affect that is being experienced.
A high level of self-focus may also influence the attributions the person makes for the loss (of. Duval & Hensley, 1976; Duval & Wieklund, 1973) . The underlying process here is identical to the more general one discussed by attribution theorists. Increasing the perceptual salience or availability of any object increases the extent to which that object influences perceptions and cognitions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) . It has been shown that the amount of causal responsibility assigned to a particular stimulus covaries with the salience of that stimulus (e.g., E Smith & Miller, 1979; Taylor & Fiske, 1978) . Because self-focus, by definition, increases the salience of the self, it follows that self-focused attention after a significant loss would increase the internality of the person's attributions for the loss. Sueh selfblame has been shown to increase the intensity of the negative affect that follows negative outcomes (e.g., McFarland & Ross, 1982) .
The mounting self-criticism, negative affect, and serf-blame may begin to push the individual's serf-image in a negative direction. To the extent that the individual's self-image was highly dependent on the lost object, the stability of his or her selfschema is likely to be undermined. This loss of stability in the self-image, coupled with the other consequences of self-regulatory perseveration, make a shift to a negative self-image quite likely.
Because the individual is highly self-focused at this point, he or she is also likely to accept blame for other negalive events that occur. Unfortunately, such outcomes are likely to be quite frequent because the individual's preoccupation with the loss may lead to neglect of other concerns. As Klinger 0975) pointed out, in such a state of active concern, most external stimuli are considered irrelevant and, therefore, are ignored. Along with this attentional problem, the mounting negative affect and self-criticism may also interfere with effective behavior in other areas, especially within the social realm (cf. Coyne, 1976) .
This proliferation of negative outcomes further exacerbates the negative affect and self-criticism. Because of the individual's perseverated self-regulatory attempts, he or she will be highly self-focused when these additional negative outcomes occu~ However, because positive outcomes may be viewed as distractions that interfere with efforts to work out problems, serf-focus may be avoided when positive outcomes occur. After a significant loss, people do not want to be temporarily cheered up; rather, they want their problems to be resolved. In addition, dwelling on positive outcomes might suggest cause for optimism, which would provide the possibility of further disappointment and disillusionment. Thus, at this point, the individual can be characterized as having adopted a depressive selffocusing style: He or she serf.focuses a great deal when negative outcomes are salient but avoids self-focus when positive outcomes are salient)
This depressive self-focusing style then maintains and exacerbates the depressive symptomatolngy. On the basis of a large body of literature on the consequences of self-focns (for reviews, see Carver & Scheie~ 1981; Wicklund, 1975) , one would expect such a pattern of self-focus allocation to (a) minimize positive affect after positive outcomes and magnify negative affect after negative outcomes, (b) decrease internal attributions for positive outcomes and increase internal attributions for negative outcomes, (c) discourage an increase in self-esteem after positive outcomes and encourage a decrease in self-esteem after negative outcomes, and (d) minimize the increase in motivation that could follow from positive outcomes and magnify the decrease in motivation that could follow from negative outcomes. In general, then, the depressive self-focusing style minimizes the positive psychological consequences of success and maximizes the negative psychological consequences of failure.
At this point, a negative self-image may be firmly entrenched. The instigating loss has made such a shift possible by undermining the stability of the individual's self-image and setting in motion the perseverated self-regulatory cycle. As long as the person continues to perseverate on the lost object, the negative affect, self-blame, and self-derogation continue to mount. Only by giving up the lost object and fostering alternate sources of identity and self-worth can this cycle be broken.
As a result of this spiral of events, the depression may deepen to the point at which the emerging negative self-image begins to provide benefits that motivate the individual to work to maintain it. The initial benefit of a negative self-image may be that it provides relief from the effortful manoeuvers necessary to maintain a positive self-image. The negative self-image may also take on value because it appears to provide a simple, parsimonious explanation for the person's negative experiences (cf. Becker, 1964 Becker, , 1973 , which may be preferable to viewing the world as unpredictable and unjust. A number of theorists (e.g., Becket, 1964 Becket, , 1973 Loner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976 ) have proposed that people are motivated to believe that the world is just. Given the choice of blaming oneself for misfortunes or viewing the world as cruel and unjust, one may choose the former as more endurable.
Finally, the negative self-image may be actively maintained because it provides a relatively safe, unassailable perspective from which to deal with the world. As Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) suggested, people may attempt to accommodate themselves to their environment (i.e., exert secondary control) when they doubt their ability to alter their environment to suit their wishes (i.e., exert primary control). Given the individual's increasingly unsuccessful interactions with the environment, he or she may give up aspirations for success and strive to be prepared for future negative outcomes by anticipating them before they occur. The individual essentially strives to minimize disappointment and disillusionment by expecting the worst (cf. Pyszczynski, 1982 ). Thus, a negative self-image may be maintained because it minimizes the potential for devastating future losses.
We suggest, then, that motivation to maintain a negative selfimage emerges because the extreme pain occasioned by the initial loss is a direct result of attachment to the object as a source of self-esteem. Because of this contingency between the prior optimistic, open investment in the object and the emotional devastation that follows its loss, the person shys away from optimism concerning anything related to the self. Hope, optimism, and a positive self-image become sources of anxiety. Because of this fear of hope, any indication that the person is competent, lovable, or valuable becomes aversive; conversely, indications of incompetence, unlovableness, or general lack of value may become somewhat comforting.
The depressive self-focusing style greatly assists the individual's effort to maintain a negative self-image and minimize hope by magnifying the consequences of failures and minimizing the consequences of successes. Thus, the more entrenched the negative self-image, the greater the adherence to the depressive selffocusing style.
To summarize the theory, (a) after the loss of a central source of self-worth, the individual is unable to exit a self-regulatory cycle focused on regaining what was lost. (b) The consequent excessive self-focus magnifies the negative affect, engenders selfcriticism, self-blame, and further negative outcomes, and leads to a depressive self-focusing style in which the individual tends to self-focus regarding negative events and avoid self-focus regarding positive events. (c) These factors contribute to a negative self-image that provides an explanation for the individual's state and a buffer against further disappointment and disillusionment. (d) The negative self-image is maintained and reinforced by the depressive self-focusing style. A schematic depiction ofthis sequence is shown in Figure 1 .
Relevant Research on Depression
Self-regulatory perseveration theory can be used to integrate a wide range of findings concerning a variety of processes involved in depression. The theory is generally consistent with what is already "known" and suggests a variety of new testable hypotheses. In this section, we review evidence that is relevant to the theory and suggest directions for future research. There seem to be three major sources of evidence concerning depression-informal clinical observations and descriptions, crosssectional and longitudinal correlational research with clinical samples, and laboratory studies with subclinically depressed samples. Each source has particular strengths and weaknesses regarding internal and external validity. Our strategy is to draw on all these sources to assess how well the theory accounts for what is known about depression.
The Onset of Depression
The Precipitating Loss Self-regulatory perseveration theory is a diathesis-stress model. It posits that depression occurs after a significant loss but that not all people who experience such a loss will become depressed. Depression occurs only when the lost object was a central source of emotional security, identity, and self-worth and few alternate sources are available. Both clinical observations and more carefully controlled descriptive studies support this proposition (e.g., Aneshensel & Frerichs, 1982; Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Beck, 1976; Billings & Mops, 1982; Brown & Harris, 1978; Freud, 1917 Freud, /1986 Lloyd, 1980; Paykel et al., 1969) . For example, Arieti and Bempporad observed that the three most common precipitators of depression are the disruption of a central (usually romantic) relationship, the death of a loved one, and a failure in the pursuit of a central self-defining goal. In a recent review, Oatley and Bolton (1985) concluded that losses of central sources and self-esteem are major predictors of the onset of depression. Thus, if one person gets depressed aiter the death of a spouse and another does not, it is not necessarily because of differences in long-standing personality characteristics but, rather, because one person invested more in his or her spouse than did the other; according to our theory, anyone may get depressed after the loss of a central source of self-esteem. Of course, some people have more vulnerable bases of self-esteem than do others; such people will be particularly susceptible to depression.
The Role of Alternative Bases of Self-Worth
It also appears that such losses are most likely to lead to depression when the individual lacks alternate sources of what w a s provided by the lost object. As Oatley and BoRon (1985) recently suggested, the need to focus on the recove~ of any one source of serf-regard is lessened to the extent that other sources remain. One particularly important source of self-worth associated with resistance to depression is the exist~ce of relationships with people other than those associated with the loss. Consistent with this point, Brown and Harris (1978) found that the loss of one's mother before the age of I 1 years seems to increase vulnerability to depression, and Blatt, Wein, Chevron, and Quinlan (1979) found that compared with nondepressed individuals, depressed individuals view their parents as less nurturant, supportive, affectionate, and concerned. It seems that those for whom parents are not current bases of self-esteem are most susceptible to depression.
In more direct support of this point, research by Aneshensel and Frerichs (1982) , Brown and Harris (1978) , Paykel et al. (1969) and others has shown that remaining social supports discourage the occurrence of depressive episodes. (See Oatley & Bolton, 1985 , for a review.) In addition, anthropological research by Parker (1962) showed that the Ojibwa, who are brought up to value a narrow range of significant others, are especially prone to depression, whereas the Eskimos, who are raised in a communal culture with a broad range of significant others, are relatively immune to depression. Similarly, Brown and Harris noted that the comparatively low incidence of depression among women living on the island of North Uist may result from the highly integrated culture that has developed there.
These findings may have implications for the well-documented finding that women appear to be more prone to depression than men (cf. Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger, 1985; Weissman & Klerman, 1977) . Although norms are currently in a period of transifion, most cultures continue to offer a greater variety of sources of self-worth to men than to women. Whereas women have been socialized to pursue interpersonal and family goals as primary sources of self-worth, men are directed toward career pursuits as well as family and collegial relationships. Along with the advantage of more possible contexts from which to derive self-esteem, men may also benefit because work accomplishments may constitute a particularly stable base for self-esteem. Consistent with these notions, Warren and McEachren (1983) found severity of depression in women to be associated with the extent to which their identity is influenced by and dependent on, relationships with others.
Preoccupation With the Loss
According to the theory, extreme dependency on the lost object as a basis for self-esteem leads to perseveration in self-regulatory attempts to recover the object. Consistent with this notion, Bowlby (1980) proposed that the course of depression following a significant loss involves a protest stage, in which the individual actively seeks to recover what was lost, and then a despair stage, in which overt activity is greatly reduced but preoccupation with the loss continues.
Similarly, research on coping strategies has shown that depressives ruminate over and refuse to accept circumstances under which mental withdrawal or accommodation would be adaptive (Coyne, Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981) . In a related vein, Kuhl and Helle (1986) found that depressed people perseverate in devoting attention to unfinished tasks; specifically, they showed that anticipating an upcoming task produced deficits in working memory among depressed subjects but not among nondepressed subjects. Finally, theorists from the sociological (Brown & Harris, 1978) , psychodynamic (Ariefi & Bemporad, 1978) , behavioral (Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981) , and cognitive (Beck, 1976) perspectives have all noted the tendency of depressed persons to dwell excessively on significant losses from the past.
Chronic Self-Focus
The proposition that depression is associated with chronic self-focus is also well documented. The correlational studies cited earlier in this article (Ingrain & Smith, 1984; T. Smith & Greenberg, 1981; indicate that depressed people are generally highly self-focused. Clinical descriptions of depressed people as self-preoccupied and self-obsessed are also consistent with this proposition (e.g., Abraham, 1927; Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Beck, 1976; Brown & Harris, 1978 ). Freud's (1917 Freud's ( /1986 view that depression involves excessive attention to the ego by the superego is also consistent with our perspccfive. The superego serves the evaluative function of comparing one's actions with internalized standards. Such self-evaluation is precisely what happens in a stage of heightened self-focus. From our perspective, an overactive superego is similar to the chronic self-focus engendered by self-regulatory perseveration.
The Development and Maintenance of Depressive Symptomatology
According to self-regulatory perseveration theory, many of the so-called symptoms of depression are created by the initial tendency to persist in self-focusing on an irreducible negative discrepancy and are maintained and exacerbated by the later emergence of a depressive self-focusing style. In this section, we first discuss evidence supporting the existence of a generalized depressive self-focusing style and then discuss evidence concerning the consequences of self-regulatory perseveration and the depressive self-focusing style.
The Depressive Self-Focusing Style
In our initial study of depressive self-focusing tendencies (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985) , depressed and nondepressed college students succeeded or failed on a supposedly well-respected test of verbal ability. They were then given 3 min to work on each of two puzzles. One of the puzzles was positioned on a table in front of a mirror so that when subjects worked on it they were confronted with their mirror images; the other puzzle was positioned on a table without a mirror. We then assessed subjects' preferences between the puzzles. Whereas nondepressed subjects showed the typical pattern of liking the selffocus-enhancing puzzle more after success than after failure (cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976; Greenberg & Musham, 1981) , depressed subjects tended to exhibit the opposite pattern, liking the self-focus-enhancing puzzle more after failure than after success. Subjects' liking for the puzzles was presumably influenced by the affect generated by the increased awareness of self-standard discrepancies brought on by the mirror.
This depressive self-focusing pattern was subsequently replicated in a study in which, after succeeding, failing, or not working on anagrams, subjects were given 10 min to allocate between working on two puzzles, one of which was positioned in front of a mirror. Consistent with our previous findings, depressed subjects spent significantly more time working on the mirror-associated puzzle after failure than after success. When compared with depressed subjeers in the no-outcome-control condition, depressed success subjects spent significantly less time working in front of the mirror, and depressed failure subjects tended to spend more time doing so.
In a third study , Study 1), we again induced depressed and nondepressecl subjects to suceeecl or fail on an anagram test; they then completed the Exner (1973) sentence completions, which were used as a measure of spontaneous self-focus. Although the expected interaction did not emerge, subjects tended to be more self-focused after failure than after success, and depressed subjects tended to be more self-focused than nondepressed subjects. Although unexpected, the tendency toward greater self-focus after failure is actually quite consistent with the notion that self-focus serves a self-regulatory function; disruptions and failures signal a need for self-regulation, which requires a shift of attention to the self. Although explicable within a self-regulatory framework, the spontaneous self-focus findings appear inconsistent with prior research showing avoidance of self-focus-enhancing stimuli after failure.
How might this discrepancy between the findings of studies using mirror avoidance and those using spontaneous self-focus be reconciled? It may be that although self-focus on a negative self-standard discrepancy is aversive for nondepressed persons, they nonetheless spontaneously self-focus in such situations because the information it provides is essential for goal attainment. A stimulus that encourages even further self-focus may simply increase the aversiveness of self-focus to a level at which it no longer serves an adaptive function. Thus, whereas nondepressed people may initially spontaneously self-focus after failme, they may avoid self-focus-enhancing stimuli because such stimuli increase their level of self-focus beyond what would be useful. However, although some increase in self-focus after failure may initially be adaptive, once time has elapsed or a new activity has begun, this adaptive value may diminish. This reasoning suggests that as the adaptive value of self-focus diminishes, nondepressed individuals may divert attention from the self and come to self-focus more after success than after failure for hedonic reasons. Depressed individuals, on the other hand, may continue to self-focus after failure and avoid self-focus alter success beyond the point at which nondepressed individuals have shifted to the opposite, more hedonically beneficial pattern.
To test these hypotheses, we , Study 2), assessed spontaneous self-focus immediately after a positive or negative outcome and again after subjects read 10 pages of involving fiction. Consistent with our previous findings, immediately after the outcome, both depressed and nondepressed individuals spontaneously self-focused more after failure than after success. After the delay, however, the nondepressed subjects showed the opposite pattern, becoming more self-focused after success than after failure; depressed subjects, on the other hand, were still more self-focused after failure than after success. Thus, after a short delay, nondepressed subjects' pattern of spontaneous self-focus paralleled earlier findings regarding their preferences for self-focus-enhancing stimuli. In contrast, depressed people persistecl in higher levels of self-focus after failure than after success, even after the delay and distraction.
Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that although the initial response to failure is an increase in self-focus among both depressed and nondepressed people, only depressed people dislike self-focus after success (Pyszczynski & Crreenberg 1985) , avoid self-focus-enhancing stimuli after success (Pyszezyuski & Greenberg 1986) , and persist in high levels of self-focus after failure and low levels of self-focus after success (Greenbcag & Pyszczynski, 1986) . 4 In addition, consistent with the notion that depressives find self-focus after success aversive and selffocus after failure somewhat comforting, in our second study , mirror exposure among de= pressed individuals was associated with poor puzzle performance after success and good puzzle performance a l~ failure.
Consequences of Self-Focused Attent ion
We turn now to a discussion of research relevant to the role of self-regulatory perseveration in the development of depressive symptoms and the role of the depressive self-focusing style in their maintenance and exacerbation.
Affect. Research has shown that self-focus inten.~fies affeetive states (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1977 ; Sebeie~ C a r v~ & Gibbons, 1981). Of course, extreme negative affect and an inability to experience positive affect are defining features of depression. It follows, then, that a tendency to perseverate in focusing on an initial loss-related negative discrepancy would intensify the negative affect engendered by the loss. Con~.~tent with this reasoning, Gibbons et al. (1985) showed that self-focus increases negative affect in clinically depressed people. The adoption of a depressive self-focusing style would exacerbate this problem by causing depressed people to experience more negative affect after other negative outcomes and less positive affect after other positive outcomes than do nondepressed people.
Indeed, such effects appeared in subsidiary aspects of one of our studies (Pyszczynski & G r e e n b e~ 1985) . ~ subjects reported that they were less pleased with their tmrfor-* Our findings of a unique depressive seW-focusing style appear ~mae-what at odds with previous correlational studies ~aowing dtlm~ed persons to be high in dispositional self-consciousnem (e.g., Ingrain & Smith, 1984; T. Smith & Grcenberg, 1981) . We ~ lhat although depressed people become chronically s e l f -f~ becau~ of t h~ inability to give up the lost object, the exception to tim ~ tendency arises when they experience positive outcome. As already ~, a~l , such outcomes may be relatively infrequent but nonzthem~ arou~ anxiety because they suggest that threat~mln~ po~m'bflity of opfimL~n regarding a positive sdf-image. Because of this anxiety, sdf-focus is avoided after positive outcomes in spite of the gvncrally high level of selfpreoccupation found in the depressed. Consistent with this reasoning, Ingrain and Smith (1984) showed that the sdf-focm~ thoughts of dopressed people are more likely to be negative and less likely to be positive than are those of nondepressed people. mance after success and more displeased after failure than did nondepressed subjects. Thus, even if depressed people experience outcomes equivalent to those of nondepressed people, the depressive self-focusing style should lead them to experience more negative affect and less positive affect.
Attributions. As noted previously, it has been shown that self-focus increases the tendency to make internal or dispositional attributions for one's behavior and outcomes (e.g., Duval, Duval, & Neeley, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Fenigstein & Levine, 1984) . If depressed people persist in self-focusing after an impactful loss, it follows that over time, they should be especially likely to blame themselves for it. This, of course, is highly consistent with clinical observations (e.g., Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Beck, 1967) . The notion that depressed people are chronically self-focused may also help explain their seemingly irrational tendency to blame themselves for negative events that are clearly outside their control (cf. Abramson & Sackheim, 1977) . Furthermore, once a depressive self-focusing style has developed, one would expect depressed people to make more internal attributions for later failures and more external attributions for successes than do nondepressed people. The literature on depressed individuals' causal attributions for positive and negative outcomes is consistent with this reasoning (For recent reviews, see Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986.) We suggest that differences between depressed and nondepressed individuals' causal attributions result largely from their different self-focusing tendencies after success and failure. In a recent study, we found support for this hypothesis by demonstrating that the self-focus pattern typical of nondepressed people (self-focus-success vs. external focus-failure) yielded a self-serving bias for both nondepressed and depressed subjects and that the self-focus pattern typical of depressed people (external focus-success vs. self-focus-failure) yielded an absence of self-serving bias for both groups .
Negative self-schema and low self-esteem. Many theorists consider low self-esteem, a negative self-schema, and heightened self-criticism to be important aspects of the depressive state (e.g., Beck, 1967; Bibring, 1953; Freud, 1917 Freud, /1986 Kuiper et al., 1982) . Consistent with such observations, research has shown that depression is associated with large discrepancies between real and ideal selves (Laxer, 1964; Nadich, Gargan, & Michael, 1975) and perceptions of large discrepancies between both real and ideal selves and standards and behavior (Kanfer & Zeiss, 1983) . Severity of depression has also been found to be inversely related to self-esteem (e.g., Brockner & Guare, 1983) .
There are several mechanisms by which self-regulatory perseveration and a depressive self-focusing style might produce decrements in self-esteem. Most contemporary theories of selfesteem posit that attributions for one's outcomes have a direct influence on self-esteem (e.g., Bowerman, 1978; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976) , with dispositional attributions for success and situational attributions for failure leading to high self-esteem. If, as suggested above, the self-focusing tendencies of depressed people encourage dispositional attributions for the initial loss and other negative outcomes and situational attributions for positive outcomes, low self-esteem is likely to result.
Self-focus may also influence self-esteem by virtue of the selfevaluative process it sets into motion. Ickes, Wicklund, and Ferris (1973) showed that self-focus increases perceived discrepancies between real and ideal selves. Thus, a tendency to self-focus after negative outcomes would increase one's awareness of his or her shortcomings; similarly, a tendency to avoid self-focus after positive outcomes would decrease one's awareness of positive qualities. Given the same actual level of competence as nondepressed people, the depressive self-focusing style may, thus, lead depressed people to less flattering self-evaluations.
Finally, self-regulatory perseveration and the depressive selffocusing style can be viewed as encouraging consideration of the implications for self of bad outcomes and discouraging consideration of the implications for self of good outcomes (cf. Hull & Levy, 1979) . As Beck (1967) pointed out, depressed individuals may view failure as highly diagnostic of global self-characteristics but view success as relatively uninformative. Carver and Ganellen (1983) recently showed depression to be correlated with the tendency to overgeneralize from one's failures. Similarly, Janoff-Bulman (1979) and Peterson, Schwartz, and Seligman (1981) have found that depressives are especially prone to engage in characterologlcal self-blame. To the extent that selffocus induces one to consider the self-implications of an outcome, the depressive self-focusing style is likely to lead the depressive to overgeneralize failures and undergeneralize successes.
Performance. It has often been noted that depressed people lack motivation (e.g., Beck, 1967; Seligrnan, 1975) . Consistent with such observations, it has been shown that depressed people perform poorly on cognitive tasks (see Miller, 1975) and in social interactions (Coyne, 1976; Gotlib, 1982; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980) . Self-regulatory perseveration and the depressive self-focusing style may contribute to such deficits in a number of ways. First, these deficits may result directly from the tendency of depressed people to be obsessed with the initial loss or their other shortcomings. Because their attention is focused elsewhere, depressed people are likely to have difficulties concentrating on current tasks, thus resulting in decrements in performance. Indeed, Kuhl (1981) and Strack, Blaney, Ganellen, and Coyne (1985) demonstrated that inducing increased self-reflection after failure increased subsequent performance deficits in nondepressed subjects. Strack et al. also demonstrated that the performance of depressed subjects is improved by encouraging them to focus on the task at hand. Finally, Jacobson and Anderson (1982) showed that depressed subjects are more likely than nondepressed subjects to refer to themselves in social interaction when such self-references are not directly solicited; this preoccupation with self may inhibit depressives' social performance by disrupting the normal flow of social interaction. Recently, Layne, Lefton, Waiters, and Merry (1983) provided evidence suggesting that such deficits in social performance result from reduced motivation.
Another motivational variable likely to contribute to performance deficits is expectancy of success. Research and clinical observation suggest that depressives tend to have pessimistic expectations (e.g., Beck, 1967; Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985; Pyszczynski, Holt, & GreenbeI~ 1987) . If depressed people dwell on failures and their implications for self but fail to do so for successes, it is likely that their expectancies for the future will become increasingly pessimistic. Pyszczynski et al. recently found that although depressed subjects reported higher estimates of the probability of future negative life events than did nondepressed subjects under conditions of high self-focus, their probability estimates for such events did not differ from those of nondepressed people under conditions of external focus. Such pessimism can help explain performance deficits because motivation for a task is assumed to vary directly with expectancy of success (e.g., Lewin, 1935; Tolman, 1932) .
Interestingly, the Carver and Scheier ( 1981 ) model of self-regulation proposes that self-focus amplifies the influence of outcome expectancies on motivation and performance. Research has shown that self-focus inhibits performance when outcome expectancies are low but facilitates performance when outcome expectancies are high (e.g., Brockner, 1979; Carver et al., 1979; Scheier & Carver, 1982) . Therefore, if depressed people tend to self-focus after failures, when future outcome expectancies are likely to be low, their motivation and subsequent performance levels should be especially low. Consistent with this reasoning, Brockner (1979) demonstrated that after an initial failure, individuals low in self-esteem (a variable positively associated with depression) pertbrm better on subsequent tasks when self-focus is decreased and worse on subsequent tasks when self-focus is increased. On the other hand, if depressed people tend to avoid self-focus after success, their performance on subsequent tasks should be less affected by the increased expectancy of success that would normally follow such outcomes.
Other aspects of depression. Because of a lack of pertinent self-awareness research, the current theory is more tentative in offering explanations for such depressive symptoms as negative automatic thoughts, anxiety, sleeplessness, poor concentration, anger, aches and pains, fatigue, and psychomotor retardation. Nonetheless, plausible explanations for these symptoms can be derived from the theory. Ofcourse, at this point, these explanations must be considered highly speculative. Beck (1976) observed that depressed individuals report negafive automatic thoughts. These thoughts consist largely of specific self-evaluations and negative generalizations about the self from a perspective seemingly removed from the individual's ongoing behavior. Such thoughts may be a result of chronic selfawareness, because self-awareness is believed to be an inherently self-evaluative state in which one views oneself as an object.
Anger and hostility are also sometimes associated with depression (e.g., Becker & Lesiak, 1977; Friedman, 1970; Paykel, 1971) . Such emotions may result in part from the frustration of self-regulatory perseveration on an irrevocable loss. It has been suggested that such feelings may be an important component of the recovery process (e.g., Gero, 1936; Taulbee & Wright, 1971) . Perhaps this is because anger and hostility sometimes facilitate disengagement from the lost object.
Anxiety may also result from persistent focus on the preeipitaring loss. As noted earlier, the loss undermines at least part of the individual's basis of self-worth. As a number of theorists and researchers have pointed out (e.g., Becker, 1962; Gollwitzer, Earle, & Stephan, 1982; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) , salient threats to self-esteem produce considerable anxiety. Interestingly, Kohler (1982) recently obtained data suggesting that anxiety and depression are related in a curvilinear faslaion: At towto moderate levels of depression, the relation is positive, whereas at high levels of depression, the relation may be negative. Such a pattern is consistent with our theory, in that people who are severely depressed may have become entrenched in a negative self-image that serves an anxiety-reducing function.
Sleeplessness and poor concentration could also plausibly result from perseverated efforts at self-regulation. Furthermore~ because self-awareness has been shown to increase awareness of internal states (Gibbons, Carver, Seheier, & Hormuth, 1979; Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, I979) , people who axe chronically self-focused would be expected to be especially aware of such bodily sensations as aches and pains.
Finally, the theory suggests a number of explanations for the symptoms of low energy and psychomotor retardation. Following a significant toss, the individual is posited to e n~ a selfregulatory cycle that is likely to increase his or her level of menhal activity. The person developing depression may actually be expending considerable energy while outwardly appearing lethargic. Thus, over time, protracted efforts at self-regulation may produce fatigue. Finally, as previously suggested, self-regulatory perseveration is likely to interfere with motivation to engage in activities other than those associated with the lost object.
Directions for Future Research
Clearly, further evidence concerning the role of serf-focus in the development and maintenance ofdepression is needed. One basic hypothesis that could be tested is that the greater the value of the goal or standard that is threatened or no longer available, the greater will be an individual's perseverance in self.regulatory efforts. Although this proposition is consistent with basic theory and research on motivation (e.g., Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, 1983; Lewin, 1935; Tolman, 1932) , further research is needed, ~y concerning the role of heightened self-focus in such perseveration.
Further laboratory and clinical research with depressed subjeers on the consequences of high self-focus after failure and low self-focus after success is also neede<L One hypothesis derived from the theory that may be particularly important is that if, for depressives, one could increase self-focus after positive outcomes and decrease self-focus after negative outcomes (i.e., reverse the depressive self-focusing style), the magnitude of the deficits associated with depression would be reduced substantially.
Of course, research on cfinical depression is of the greatest relevance to the theory. The ideal study would be a prospective longitudinal study of a sample large enough to include substantial numbers of individuals who eventually experience significant losses. Such research could test the following hypotheses: (a) Losses that undermine the basis of self-worth are especially likely to lead to depression; (b) among individuals who experience significant losses, those with particularly fragile self-esteem and a narrow range of sources of self-worth are most likely to become depressed; (c) after such losses, individuals become chronically self-focused; (d) following such aloss, extent of selffocus covaries with extent of negative mood, self-blame, and negative self-image; (e) persistence in self-focus and preoccupation with the loss are associated with severity of depressive symptoms; and (f) recovery is associated with lowered self-focus, evidence of letting go of the object, and increasing valuation and attachment to an alternative source or sources of selfworth.
Clinical Implications: The Alleviation o f Depression Although specific recommendations for treatment are beyond the sco~ of this work, we can draw a few general implications. Self-regulatory perseveration theory suggests that several things must happen, either spontaneously or through the help of therapy, for a person to recover from depression. The person must (a) exit the self-regulatory cycle focused on the lost object, (b) get over his or her fear of hope regarding alternate sources of self-worth, and (c) reverse the depressive self-focusing style and return to normal self-regulatory functioning.
If depression results from self-regulatory perseveration, therapeutic attempts to help the individual let go of the lost object should be beneficial. Interventions aimed at helping the person understand that he or she can live a happy, productive life without the lost object (e.g., rational-emotive therapy; Ellis, 1962) might be useful in this regard. Helping him or her discover and focus on substitute sources of self-regard would be one way of accomplishing this goal. In the case of the loss of a valued person or occupation, the enlistment of other social sources of selfvalue would be an especially desirable approach. Some degree of social pressure on the individual to continue functioning on a daily basis, within a socially supportive context, may also be beneficial. Perhaps a shift in environment or routines could be of help to the extent that the current environment is laden with cues that remind the individual of the loss (Klinger, 1975) . Strategies involving anger toward and devaluation of the lost object might also be useful in some cases.
Of course, getting the depressed person to invest in such alternate sources of self-worth may be difficult because of fear of further loss. Thus, therapeutic attempts to reduce this fear may be necessary. To this end, it may be useful to gradually encourage the person to invest in multiple sources of self-esteem; in this way, the threat of losing any one source would be less anxiety inducing.
Before such attempts at attachment to other objects are likely to be successful, some of the damage to self-esteem brought on by the loss may have to be repaired. Thus, one important goal of therapy should be eliminating the depressive self-focusing style. In contrast to the many approaches to psychotherapy that encourage high levels of self-reflection and self-insight, it may be necessary to encourage less rather than more self-reflection regarding negative experiences. Interestingly, Sehmitt (1983) noted that insight-oriented therapies, which lead clients to focus on their negative affect, have been less successful in treating depression than cognitive and behavioral therapies, which do not.
The tendency to avoid self-focus after positive events may be equally pernicious because it robs the depressed person of the positive affect and boost to self-esteem that such events could entail. Thus, therapy should also encourage higher levels of selffocus after positive events. Of course, positive experiences are often few and far between for depressed people. Thus, it may be necessary to assist the individual in rearranging his or her environment so that such experiences become more frequent (cf. Lewinsohn, 1975) . For example, Beck (1976) used mastery experiences combined with a program of graded task assignmerits to facilitate success; he then encouraged clients to selffocus on such successes by requiring them to write about them.
Of course, the depressive syndrome often recedes over time without the aid of therapy. From the present perspective, whether depression undergoes rapid spontaneous remission or becomes a chronic problem depends largely on how quickly the individual is able to adopt alternative sources of self-worth. Fortunately, most people are not solely dependent on any one source of self-esteem. To the extent that alternate sources of self-esteem are available, the person may more readily exit the self-regulatory cycle and increase investment in these alternate sources; in this way, perseveration on the loss may be minimized, and the adoption of the depressive self-focusing style and a negative self-image may be averted.
C o m p a r i s o n With Other Self-Attentional Theories o f Depression
Recently, other theories of depression have begun to consider the role of self-attentional and self-regulatory processes (Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981; Lewinsohn et al., 1985) . The Kanfer and Hagerman model is based on a model of self-regulation similar in some respects to the one proposed by Carver and Scheier (1981) . Kanfer and Hagerman proposed that if, during selfmonitorin& the individual blames him-or herself for a major loss, he or she will engage in severe negative self-reinforcement, eventually give up the lost object, and generalize this withdrawal to other domains. In contrast, we propose that protracted efforts at self-regulation after a major loss lead to self-blame and other characteristics of depression; in other words, the failure to give up the lost object is what leads to depression. Based on self-awareness theory and research, our theory can explain why a major loss may lead to a state of excessive self-focus and how such a state can lead to a wide variety of"symptoms" of depression. Finally, Kanfer and Hagerman did not consider the possibility of the development of a depressive self-focusing style and the crucial role that such a pattern may play in the maintenance of depression. Kuhl's (1985) recent theoretical work on action control, or self-regulatory processes involved in the implementation of intentions into actions, also bears some similarities to the present conceptualization. Action control theory is concerned with the self-regulatory processes required to ensure that intended actions are performed. Kuhl distinguished between two qualitatively different modes of self-regulation. An action orientation is a change-promoting mode of control in which the individual focuses on a particular plan of action. A state orientation, on the other hand, is a change-preventing orientation in which the individual focuses on some internal or external state. The state orientation is characterized by perseverated thoughts related to a past, present, or future state of the organism. Kuhl (1981) provided evidence that performance deficits found in the learned helplessness paradigm are mediated by a switch to state orientation after exposure to uncontrollable outcomes. From this perspective, helplessness effects occur because the state orientation interferes with the individual's ability to concentrate on the "test task" in the helplessness paradigm.
The concept of state orientation appears similar to the notion of self-regulatory perseveration as used in the present theory. Both involve a preoccupation with particular events and an inability to focus attention on other ongoing concerns. The central difference appears to lie in the extent to which the self is implicated in this preoccupation. Action control theory gives no particular significance to self-related perseveration in response to failure and loss; self-regulatory perseveration theory, on the other hand, is based on the notion that people become excessively self-focused after the loss of a central source of selfworth. From the present perspective, it is preoccupation with the self-related aspects of a loss that is particularly significant in the onset and maintenance of depression. As argued above, the literature on the consequence of self-focused attention suggests that such excess self-focus on an irreducible negative discrepancy is capable of producing a wide array of characteristics commonly found among depressed individuals.
The Lewinsohn et al. (1985) model is more explicitly derived from the self-awareness literature. It was developed independently of our model, and thus, this convergence on the importance of selffocus is encouraging. Lewinsohn et al?s position concurs with the present theory in positing that extreme negative affect and disruption of daffy activities caused by stressful life events encourage an increase in self-focus that in turn encourages a variety of depressive symptoms (e.g., negative affect and self-criticism). It does not, howeve~ explain why depressed people persist in such self-focus in spite of the further negative affect that it engenders. Our notion that high levels of investment in an unattainable goal impedes dise p~m e n t from the self-regulatory cycle provides a straightforward and plausible explanation for this phenomenon. Such an explanation is crucial to a specification of the conditions under which depression is likely to occur.
The other major difference between the theories is that whereas Lewinsohn et al. (1985) proposed a general increment in self-focus in depressives, we have shown that a unique depressive self-focusing style in which self-focus is high after negative outcomes but low after positive outcomes develops Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985 , 1986 . The literature on self-focus strongly suggests that such a tendency, rather than generally heightened self-focus, most readily accounts for the characteristics of depression. For example, selffocus can intensify positive as well as negative affect (e.g., Seheier & Carver, 1977) . Similarly, depending on expectancies, self-focus can increase or decrease motivation (e.g., Carver et al., 1979) . Thus, we argue that it is the tendency to persist in self-focus after negative outcomes and avoid self-focns after positive outcomes, rather than a general tendency to self-focus, that maintains and exacerbates depression.
Conclusion
In most respects, our analysis is not in conflict with other theories of depression. Rather, it provides an integrative framework that may provide useful insights into many of the processes emphasized by these theories. Psychodynamic theories emphasize the roles of loss and damage to self-esteem in depression. The present theory concurs on this point but explains the role of loss in terms of an empirically well-supported conceptual framework rather than in terms of complex and highly speculative intrapsychic processes. The attributional model of learned helplessness posits that internal, stable, global attributions for failure and the resulting negative outcome expectancies contribute to depression because they generate a generalized sense of helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978) . Self-regulatory perseveration and the depressive self-focusing style can help explain why such attributions and expectancies are likely to occur. Similarly, the more general cognitive approaches taken by Beck (1967) and Kuiper et al. (1982) posit that depression is characterized by a negative self-schema that biases the individual toward increasingly negative views of self and the world. As described earlier, self-regulatory perseveration and the e m e rgence of a depressive self-focusing style may contribute greatly to the development and maintenance of such negative self-schemata and general pessimism.
Finally, behavioral approaches emphasize reduction in positive reinforcers and maladaptive social interactions. The depressive self-focusing style can help explain why many activities and outcomes have reduced reinforcement value for the depressed person; by leading to attentional and motivational deftcits, the depressive self-focusing style may also contribute to poor social outcomes. Although thorough comparisons with all major theories of depression are beyond the scope of this article, we suggest that the self-regulatory perseveration theory provides an integrative framework for understanding the roles of a variety of factors that are emphasized by these other theories.
Although generally compatible with other theories, there is one crucial point on which self-regulatory imrseveration theory diverges from most other contemporary theories of depression. Many theories conceptualize depression as a phenomenon in which the individual gives up on unattainable goals and then generalizes this loss of motivation to other domains (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1980; Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981; Klinger, 1975; Seligman, 1975) . In contrast, we suggest that depression occurs as the result of an inability to give up when it would be adaptive to do so. Depressed people do indeed appear to be passive and unmotivated. Howeve~ rather than viewing this passivity as a generalized giving up after an inability to attain (or maintain) a central motivational commitment, we argue that passivity in other realms is a consequence of self-regulatory preoccupation with a significant loss.
In conclusion, whereas the present theory diverges from the tenor of other approaches to depression in this way, it provides a framework that can be used to integrate many of the phenomena emphasized by other theories. The theory is based on a clear and well-supported conceptual framework, it is highly consistent with a wide variety of clinical observations and systematic research, and it has clear implications for treatment and further research of depression. Still, the label depression is appfied to a complex, diverse, and multifaceted set of phenomena; in our use of the term depression and our characterizations of prior research, we have undoubtedly oversimplified the phenomena.
We believe, however, that this is unavoidable in developing and presenting an integrative theory of a problem as complex as depression; we hope that the heuristic value of the theory compensates for such shortcomings. Of course, by adopting different perspectives, each theory of depression provides unique insights into particular aspects of it. We do not offer our theory to supplant other theories but to supplement them, in the hope that it facilitates understanding of the complex and diverse phenomena labeled depression.
